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OLC #78-1548

26 April 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Benjamin F. Pepper  
Chief, SE/ORP

SUBJECT: Meeting with House Select Committee on Assassinations  
(HSCA) Staffer Ken Kline, 26 April 1978

1. For the second time I met with Mr. Ken Kline for a couple of hours at CIA Headquarters, present also were Mr. Patrick Carpentier and "Shep" Mr. Shepanek of CIA. During the latter portions of our meeting Vasia Gmerkin of CI Staff joined us. In haste, but for the record, the following is noted:

a. With respect to the 835-page draft paper, which we are sanitizing for the House Select Committee for Assassinations (HSCA), I noted that we had some problems. The first was the fact that there was a lot of information on American and foreign leads supplied by Nosenko, that is identifications of individuals who are agents or developmentals, or were of interest to the KGB, as reported by Nosenko. I noted that I realized that we had no legal right to excise these names (having been so informed by Mr. Len McCoy, DC/CI on the basis of his discussion with our lawyers), but that I failed to see why the biographic data was germane to the HSCA investigation. I also noted that we would be excising any information regarding these leads that came to us from either the FBI or foreign liaison services. Mr. Kline replied that the names of Americans were essential, but that he thought that his committee staff could do without the names of foreigners. He promised

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SECRET

- 2 -

to call me to confirm. He agreed with our stated intention to delete references to information from the FBI or foreign liaison services.

b. Mr. Kline complained that because of the large amount of excised material from the 400-page study which we had already provided him with, he needed an oral briefing on the general content of these excisings. With great reluctance I agreed to review these excisions and brief him to the extent possible.

c. Mr. Kline asked if there were any written comments by Deryabin regarding his interrogations of Nosenko. He is interested in having these as soon as possible because he intends to talk to Deryabin tomorrow, 27 April. I added that I was unaware of any such comments, but would check and get them to him as soon as possible if there were any. (Upon checking I found a section of the 835-page study which does pertain as well as Deryabin memos, and these portions are being made available through Mr. Shepanek today.)

d. Mr. Kline asked to see the full extent of Nosenko's reporting on Oswald. I told him that this information had been provided to CI Staff, but that I would see that he got it as soon as possible. (I am looking into this matter this afternoon and will get this material to him.)

e. Mr. Kline had some questions about KGB training facilities in Minsk. These questions arose because of Epstein's theory that Oswald was trained in Minsk and the implications from an emigre report which I had earlier made available to Mr. Kline that there was a KGB training facility in Minsk. (I am researching this, but at this moment it looks like the emigre reporting is indicative of staff officer instead of agent training and it is not at all clear that this unevaluated reporting is accurate.)

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

f. Mr. Kline wanted all CIA information on KGB procedures, particularly with regard to the handling of American defectors. (I pointed out that to the best of my knowledge there is very little information on this topic. Mr. Kline pointed out that he was aware of some ten redefectors who presumably had supplied the U.S. Government with information in this regard. I told him if anyone had talked to these redefectors if probably would have been the FBI and that he might want to query them, but in the meantime I would look into this question.

g. Mr. Kline requested a briefing on the Second Chief Directorate operations against Americans to give him a context in which to place both Nosenko reporting and Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union. He told me he would give me convenient days in early May for such a briefing and I said we would <sup>o3</sup> accommodate. (I plan to ask Mr. (Ed Andrews) to take care of this briefing, the emphasis being on the time Oswald was in the Soviet Union.)

2. I tried to gently suggest to Mr. Kline that if he was setting about to establish Nosenko's bona fides he had many problems facing him. I enumerated some of them, noting particularly the need to place Nosenko's picture of the KGB in the context of other information we had from active sources and defectors. I noted that we obviously could not share all this information with the HSCA even if they had the five years to study such material. Mr. Kline said it was not the business of the committee to establish Nosenko's bona fides, but only to establish the validity of Nosenko's remarks regarding Oswald. He added, however, that the committee needed additional information on Nosenko, the KGB, etc., etc., in order to place Nosenko's information on Oswald in context.

3. The last portion of our meeting was devoted to the upcoming threat that Nosenko will be forced to appear in public session before the HSCA. I noted all the security


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- 4 -

problems involved, particularly stressing that if either face, body or voice become known through television, radio, or observation to the public, Nosenko's life would be greatly jeopardized. Mr. Kline thought that adequate security precautions could be found to deal with this problem, but noted that this matter would have to be left for later resolution. Obviously, he and the committee want Nosenko, the prime witness, to appear in public, thereby giving the committee the full benefit of his testimony. I suggested that a full transcript of an executive meeting would suffice for these purposes.

  
Benjamin F. Pepper

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